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Article 10

et al.: Questions and Answers

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Ms. SMABY: Professor Farber, let me begin with you. Let us
assume that R.A.V. lived on a university campus. What sort of
First Amendment issues are raised in light of the "special obligations and powers of a university?"
PROFESSOR FARBER: I like teaching better because I get to
ask the questions; other people have to answer them.
The Supreme Court has created a special set of rules about
regulation of speech on government property under which
what the government can do depends on what kind of property
it is and what its other uses are. So one thing to think about
here would be the nature of the property that is being used.
This is presumably not an area which is set aside for speech
purposes-not an area that's commonly used like a public park
or some place else for speeches and demonstrations-and that
gives the government a lot of additional leeway. Actually, I
worked on an amicus brief with the ACLU arguing that that set
of rules doesn't make any sense, but those are the rules right
now.
There also may be some rules-although I don't think the
Court has ever really dealt with this landlord-tenant situation-which give special powers to the government in connection with its own employees because the government has the
right to make sure that its offices work and that the business
gets done. Similarly, within high schools, the school's obligation to keep the educational process going gives it more power
to regulate speech within the school than it has outside.
I think you can make a similar argument about the landlordtenant relationship; the school has the ability to ensure that its
tenants don't harass each other or disrupt each others' lives.
So it's very hard to say exactly what the lines would be because
clearly the First Amendment just doesn't disappear within the
dorm. I think the government probably would have more
leeway.
PROFESSORJONES: In Doe v. Michigan,' the district court considered a plan that embraced a three-zone notion with differ1. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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ent speech rules in each of the different zones. One would be
the residential area where students lived. Another would be
the educational facilities, the classrooms, the libraries, and so
on. And the third would be the general campus areas. The
court suggested that its plan was a rational way of dividing up
the campus. It has many interests, it has many different functions taking place. The district court did not reach the question whether that division of the campus made any sense. Do
you think that it makes sense or not?
PROFESSOR FARBER: Yes, I think so. I think something along
those lines does make sense. Not necessarily what was specifically done in that case, but it seems to me that there are common-sense differences between saying something in a class
that somebody else doesn't want to hear and breaking into
their dorm room and saying the same thing. I think that in all
these situations, we still have to keep in mind the value of free
speech, and so there can be some difficult problems about how
far to go in these different situations. But it seems to me that it
does make sense to consider some of those factual contexts.
Ms. SMABY: Michael Sandberg, I'd like you to respond to a
statement from an editorial in the Chicago Tribune. They wrote,
"The danger in singling out specific symbols or expressions,
no matter how odious they are, is that the list only grows
longer as political and social tides turn."
MR. SANDBERG: I think that the editorial correctly recognizes
that speech-based or expression-based prohibitions very likely
will have that result. The uses of the campus conduct codes at
issue in the University of Michigan case were, in some cases,
overwhelmingly political. They had little to do with conduct
that was genuinely disruptive of campus operations.
The difference between that kind of approach-it's hate regulation but it's an upside down regulation where you start with
the hate and then take a few examples and outlaw those, which
is really what the St. Paul ordinance does-is problematic from
the inception. That is why we have started with the crime and
then added the penalty when the crime is proven to have been
motivated by hate. There's a cross burning prosecution that
reached the Eighth Circuit, the federal circuit court of appeals
governing the area. United States v. Lee, 2 involved a cross burn2. 935 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1991), vacated &reh'g granted en banc in part, (Aug. 14,
1991).
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ing adjacent to an apartment building, and the facts at trial
showed that it was directed for racist reasons at an African
American family that moved into that building. And there, the
language of the statute talks not about arousing anger or alarm
or resentment, but rather about conduct that will result in injury, oppression, a threat, or intimidation of a person or a
group of persons in the exercise of federally protected rights,
such as the right to vote, the right to occupy a dwelling, and
the right to have a fair trial and a jury trial. Taking criminal
conduct at the core will avoid most of, but not all of, the discussion about First Amendment issues and problems. Because
we will be focusing on things that we all agree are examples of
breaking the law. Lots of things that could theoretically be
prosecuted by a prosecutor who is unlike the one currently in
office would be things that none of us in the room would believe break the law.
Ms. SMABY: Mr. Foley, why did you prosecute under the ordinance rather than under, for example, the arson statute?
MR. FOLEY: We did charge under the assault statute and that
count is still pending until the resolution of the United States
Supreme Court case.
But I'd like to get back to looking at the difference between
what is speech and what is conduct. In this particular case, this
was conduct that violated the fighting words standard as
adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Minnesota
Supreme Court doesn't outlaw all cross burnings or all offensive speech or conduct. It clearly says: "The challenged St.
Paul ordinance does not on its face assume that any cross
burning, irrespective of the particular context in which it occurs, is subject to prosecution. Rather, the ordinance censors
only those displays that one knows or should know amount to
fighting words. Conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to
incite an immediate violence."
That's what we're talking about in this case. This is conduct
that was targeted at a particular African American family and
directly caused fear, intimidation, threats, and coercion. You
have to look at the context-the placing of a cross in the
fenced yard of the only African-American family in the neighborhood in the middle of the night where they cannot retreat.
The family didn't ask for them to come into their own yard;
they're a captive audience. That is a direct threat to those indi-
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viduals. If they wanted to give a political speech or stand at the
state capitol and burn a cross, as offensive as that might be, it
would not be illegal under the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation. This is conduct and not speech.
Ms. SMABY: There seems to be more agreement among the

panel members about the appropriateness of such an ordinance if hate speech is targeted. And yet you argue that regulating targeted speech is not appropriate?
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: As I said at the outset, I think there is
widespread agreement on this panel that the underlying conduct was appropriately subject to prosecution under a number
of laws, and that, as written, the St. Paul ordinance under
which it was prosecuted is unconstitutionally overbroad.
The ACLU disagrees with the Minnesota Supreme Court's
attempt to rewrite the ordinance simply to incorporate, in very
conclusory ways, U.S. Supreme Court doctrines. That "interpretation" departs so radically from what the St. Paul City
Council did. And so, for reasons of democratic governance,
it's appropriate to have an elected governmental body decide
how to rewrite the statute.
But-more importantly, perhaps, from a constitutional law
point of view-there is a serious free speech problem with the
ordinance even as rewritten by the Minnesota Supreme Court:
the problem of vagueness. A reasonable person looking at the
law and looking at the Supreme Court's revision of the law has
no clear notice as to exactly what is prohibited. You cannot
simply view this conclusory legal label "fighting words," as to
which reams have been written, and determine exactly what it
means. Likewise with the incitement test. Therefore, we think
it has to be rewritten even more specifically. And what's interesting to me is that, as I understand Mr. Foley, he probably
would agree with our suggestions about how it should be rewritten. So why not say that in black and white? Give clear
notice to all people who are subject to prosecution under that
the statute. Don't use conclusory labels such as "fighting
words," but talk about the specific indicia that we seem to
agree on: that it's targeted at a specific individual, that there is
actual intent, and that there is a reasonable fear of violence.
Ms. SMABY: Do you agree?
MR. FOLEY: I think even the American Civil Liberties Union
is on record as supporting the concept of fighting words as it
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss4/10
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applies to college speech codes. So if you talk about a direct
targeted threat against an individual, yes, that is criminal conduct and that's what this ordinance says. You can't read the
ordinance, unfortunately, as written. You have to read it as
interpreted after the judicial construction. So we are arguing
fighting words; this is a fighting words case. The Supreme
Court hopefully will give us some guidance in how to define
the type of legislative codes we're talking about. I agreed with
Ed Cleary that, as written, it's very vague and overbroad. But
as narrowed, it is very constitutional and applies only to
targeted conduct that is a direct threat against an individual.
MR. CLEARY: The response that Tom has just made, I think,
is a mistake. Tom is incorporating the attempt to threaten and
the intent to intimidate into the law, and that isn't what the
fighting words doctrine says. Actually, I challenge anyone to
tell me what it really says. In any case, it's out there, and when
you resort to it in the context of this law, as Nadine has just
said, you openly invite selective enforcement of the law because of its vagueness. And you're again going to have
problems with community standards as to when such a law
should be enforced. If you take fighting words and you incorporate it into a political law like this, good luck.
Ms. SMABY: Mr. Cleary, why isn't the First Amendment implicated when an accused is given an enhanced penalty for
committing an underlying criminal offense with a hateful
motive?
MR. CLEARY: That's actually very interesting. We could
have another debate about that.
I have some problems with the enhancement laws. I did not
choose to challenge this one because it requires different constitutional scrutiny, and I didn't feel that the Court was ready
to accept certiorari on that. I do have problems, as Michael
and I talked earlier about, with some of the aspects of biased
enhancement laws because I think, again, you have some
vagueness problems when you say someone has assaulted
someone or threatened someone "by reason of," or "because
of," their race, religion, or gender. Where do you draw the
line as to how far back you go into their past, their friendships,
or the literature they've read? The cases we usually hear about
are the ones on the street where someone has uttered really
ugly racial epithets, so we know the conduct is probably raPublished by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
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cially based. But the law isn't limited to those situations. The
law leaves it open as to how far back you're going to go into
their feelings on religion or race or gender, and that opens up
some pretty questionable areas.
It's also rather vague in terms of who's going to enforce that
law. I think the experience-and I think Nadine would agree
with me-with these laws is that they are very often are turned
around on the very groups that seek their protection. She
made that point earlier today, and that's true. That's been true
with student speech codes as well.
Ms. SMABY: I had an opportunity to briefly review a summary of the 1992 crime bill passed by the Minnesota Legislature. I believe there was a provision in there with respect to
hate crimes. I think that the provision was that a law enforcement officer can no longer determine on his or her own
whether a hate crime has been committed, but rather must forward to the prosecution the victim's assessment of whether
that crime was motivated by hate. Now what kinds of questions
does that raise in all of this?
MR. CLEARY:

They're obviously trying to get away from the

police determination as to whether it's a race issue or a religion
issue, etc. out of a suspicion that the police may be insensitive
to claims of bias. I think there are minorities present here who
would agree with me that for very good reasons they don't always trust the police, and they may not give them the assessment that they're looking for, particularly in the ambiguous
area of certain hate crimes. And it also raises the issue, as far
as I'm concerned, with areas like religion and gender. Are we
going to start having prima facie cases if it's ajewish victim and
a Catholic assailant? Are we going to guess as to whether or
not the crime was related to religion? What kind of evidence is
necessary to bring it to a hate crime status? If we take that
determination out of the hands of the police, which may be a
smart thing to do, we're still going to have the problem with
the victim doing the assessment. My guess is that the people
who are going to feel empowered enough to tell the police
they are bias victims are not going to be the people for whom
these laws were created.
MR. SANDBERG:

A couple of points. I spend a lot of time

now with law enforcement professionals who are training officers on new laws. Most, if not all, of these hate crime statutes

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss4/10

6

et al.: Questions and Answers
1992]

HATE SPEECH AFTER R.A.V.

1007

are basically new laws, and they require of law enforcement
something that the ordinary underlying investigation of a criminal offense, like an assault or a battery, does not require. To
investigate an assault, I don't really need to know anything
about why A has assaulted B. I really don't need to know why.
To determine whether a hate crime has been committed, I really do need to know why. I need to know about statements
made by the perpetrator during the time surrounding the incident, whether they are in writing or out loud, about the kinds
of other evidence that would suggest a particular intent on the
part of a perpetrator. There are questions that law enforcement officials usually don't have to ask. They do have to ask
them in this area. One of the most difficult things that we've
encountered in large and small police departments is trying to
ensure that the questions are asked in a way that's designed to
get at the information.
I have one example, if I may, in the case of the victimization
of someone by virtue of sexual orientation. While our statistics
are disturbing in anti-Semitic incidents, organizations such as
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, who have begun to attempt to monitor instances of harassment and assault against
gay and lesbian victims, suggest that the growth is geometric in
those kinds of incidents, partly because they are only newly being reported and partly because they are truly on the increase.
Suppose you are a law enforcement officer and encounter a
man who is on the ground just a few feet away from a bar or
establishment that you know, because you patrol that beat, has
historically catered to a gay male clientele. Do you walk up to
the person who is lying there on the ground and injured and
say, "All right, we've got to get a report going on this. Listen:
who hit you, and do you think that he hit you because you're
gay?" Number one, that may be taken by the victim as yet a
second victimization. Many cities and states don't have human
rights statutes that offer protection for housing, employment,
and public accommodation-a very separate discussion. Some
do. Very few do. No federal law does. So a person whose sexual orientation up to that time has been his or her own business may now be confronted by a law enforcement officer who
might not be showing much in the way of interest or concern
or sympathy but has a report to fill out.
We've suggested that the questioning can proceed. There's
no magic answer to this. You may need to confront that victim
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
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and say, "Let's try to get some information so that we can
catch whoever did this to you," and start in on the questions
and at some point during the questioning say, "We've had
some reports at the police department of some instances of gay
bashing in this area that we, as a department, plan to address
very seriously." And then you can move on to whatever the
next question is. If you've made a statement as a potential advocate of this victim, the person might open up to you. In the
case of victims who have been targeted by virtue of religion or
race, that reluctance is not there to the same extent, with the
exception of some new immigrant communities where, again,
trust in law enforcement is either nonexistent or at low levels.
We've told law enforcement audiences-at least I have-that
in the hate crimes area, they're in a very high risk, very high
reward field. The risks are obvious. With new reporting requirements, you don't want to say, "Well, we had three in Minnesota last year," only to have a multitude of civil rights
organizations and others who attempt to monitor this say there
were 373. Where were you on the other 370? You risk a troop
of people marching to the chief's office or the mayor's office
saying that law enforcement is unprofessional or inappropriate. These are serious risks. You risk media coverage, some of
it very responsible, some of it hyped up and less responsible.
But the rewards are there too because we found that when hate
crimes are dealt with professionally and seriously, new friendships can emerge in minority communities with law enforcement where they previously had very chilly relationships.
Ms. SMABY: Let me move to Professor Jones and Professor
Winer with the next question. How do you respond to the assertion that the hate crime laws, whether constitutional or not,
are simply ineffective?
PROFESSOR JONES: I think what we are experiencing in our
society is a rise in fear and a rise in hatred and the expression
of hatred. That has very, very deep and profound roots in the
culture. And law is not going to be the end-all answer to curbing this kind of activity. But I think that one thing we have to
rely upon is the use of criminal law to establish a standard, a
principle of behavior or conduct which serves as a deterrent to
most people who are willing to conform their behavior to the
norms of the law. Now that's something that I think is very
important. I think that's something that we really simply have
to trust.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss4/10
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PROFESSOR STROSSEN: If I can interject something: I think
one problem we have is that all the laws on the books that
would already prohibit assault and these various other crimes
are not being zealously enforced with respect to minority
groups, including African Americans and gay men. A lot of the
problems would be solved if we could simply vigorously and
neutrally enforce the existing laws.
MR. SANDBERG:

But we can't and we won't because I don't

expect that kind of police attention. I'll use an example that I
frequently use: somebody sprays on my garage, "Laimbeer was
right; Bulls will be eliminated." I'm a Chicago Bulls fan. I was
before Michael Jordan joined the team. This is blasphemous,
to borrow from Ed's opening remarks. But I don't really expect, and probably shouldn't expect, police to canvas my
neighborhood to see whether neighbors might have been
awake between two and five a.m. when this is likely to have
happened. I don't expect the police to turn a community upside down or inside out to dig into the roots of what is criminal
to be sure, but really a prank.
If my garage door says "Hitler was right; Jews will be eliminated," I'm going to expect a different kind of law enforcement and community attention and support. And I'm hopeful
that I'll get it. But I really ought to have the statutory equipment that ensures that I will get it. I ought not leave that to
chance. And I'll tell you, initial indications are that victims are
beginning to get the kind of law enforcement support and attention that they deserve. These things are not being treated
as jokes or pranks. They are being treated as the serious
crimes that they are. Under preexisting law, the Laimbeer
spraying and the Hitler spraying were the very same crime:
misdemeanor criminal damage to property. I live in Chicago,
we have however many million people there, and I will tell you
the result when we go to court, even if somebody is caught at
the end of the Laimbeer spray painting, everybody will go back
home. No one will have any other place to report to other than
home.
MR. FOLEY: If I might just say that the harm being done

when you say "all Jews will be eliminated" isn't only to that
individual; the harm is done to the whole minority population

to which that individual belongs. The whole community suffers as a result of these targeted crimes. So we have to pass
legislation which addresses the harm and injury done to these
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
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individuals and to the community and the minority populations that they represent.
PROFESSOR WINER: On the question of effectiveness, your
view depends on your view of the intended effect of the statute.
There are, I think, at least three rationales that legislatures can
use. I'm not going to sit here and argue that every state should
pass a hate crimes statute. What I will say is that there are
rational, responsible bases that a state legislature can have for
doing so. And you've heard some of them alluded to, and let
me list them-another thing that lawyers do.
The first possible rationale is that there should be greater
punishment to take account of the greater injury. Remember
that when a person is a victim of a hate crime-say a battery
that's a hate crime-the mere offensive touching is not the only
injury that's taken place. There's been a substantial psychological injury, too. And the law does, in many contexts, notice
psychological harm. Harassment laws are an example of that.
So the injury is greater to the individual than the mere criminal
act itself.
Secondly, the injury is greater to the individual's community
than to the individual. Lynching is a classic example of that.
The person who is hanged is not the only victim of a lynching.
That's the second rationale.
The third rationale is that, unfortunately in this society, as
Mr. Abrams indicated, there is a lot of bigotry out there. A lot
of multidimensional bigotry. And you can view that as being
an extra impetus, an extra motivation to commit this particular
kind of crime. If there's the extra motivation to commit that
particular kind of crime, the theory can be that you need an
extra degree of deterrent to counteract that extra degree of
impetus.
So there are three distinct reasons why a competent, rational, responsible legislature might want to pass a hate crime
law. There are already statutes on the books against harassment and assault and battery, as I've indicated. Those kinds of
laws will spark symposia such as this, potential victims will become aware of their rights, and law enforcement officers will
become aware of what is expected of them. You have those
effects as well as the strictly legal effects.
PROFESSOR JONES: I agree with the distinctions that Professor Farber drew earlier. One reason why I would not like to
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss4/10
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see the Supreme Court remand the case to the St. Paul city
council to rewrite the statute is because drawing a statute that
deals effectively with this particular kind of harm is a problem
that should be entrusted to a very small number of very, very
highly specialized experts in constitutional adjudication, which
is our Supreme Court of the United States, not a city council.
I think the Supreme Court is probably going to say, "What
we're really dealing with, or must deal with, is not offensiveness but harm." And there's a real distinction to be drawn,
and one thing that lawyers like to do is define things. A moral
philosopher, Joel Feinberg, defines harm as a setback to interests. Now that's a very simple definition, but I think to some
extent it's what some of us have been alluding to. What sort of
harm are we talking about? Obviously, those interests that are
legally protected would be included. We would all agree that a
communication with that effect would be subject to criminal
proscription. If it is an invasion of one's psyche and it causes
predictable harm, or measurable harm, it would seem to me
that we're saying that the law ought to reach that kind of a
situation. So I think that the Supreme Court can do that, and I
think that the obligation on it now is to do that very precisely
so that when other legislators and city councils draft these
kinds of statutes, they know a little bit more about what they're
doing.
Ms. SMABY: You would like the U.S. Supreme Court to do
that, but our next question is: Why not abolish all speech and
let the Minnesota Supreme Court decide how much is allowable or prohibited? Are you comfortable with that?
PROFESSOR STROSSEN:

I think the question makes a very

good point through an extreme example, one that is really only
somewhat further along the continuum than the St. Paul ordinance at issue. Everybody, including Tom Foley, has acknowledged that we started with a law that is very overbroad. It
banned, or purported to ban, much protected speech. It's
analogous to the hypothetical posed by the question: St. Paul
has banned a lot of speech that everybody agrees is protected
and then asked the Minnesota Supreme Court to carve out a
little area of protection within that. This approach is not appropriate in terms of free speech principles, and it's not appropriate in terms of democratic governance principles.
MR. FOLEY:

All speech is not protected. There are a number

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
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of limitations on free speech. You can't say, "I'm going to kill
you" because it's a direct threat. In the libel area and the pornography area, there's speech and expression that is clearly

limited. Protection for fighting words is very limited, and the
Minnesota Supreme Court did an excellent job limiting the St.
Paul ordinance to say, in this particular area, it is not
protected.

Ms. SMABY: Mr. Abrams, I want to throw a question to you.
Would the First Amendment allow the prohibition of first, the
placement of an offensive object or sign on the property of a
white homeowner by an African American or, second, placement of an offensive sign on the property of an African American if it targets a white person? Why or why not?
MR. ABRAMS: Clearly, there is no constitutional right to
place anything on the private property of others without their
consent. So I think that takes care of the first one. An African
American would have no right to place an offensive sign on the
private property of a white family.
Now as to whether or not an African American can place an
offensive sign aimed at whites on his own property; maybe.
And I think it may depend on what the sign says and what's
involved.
Earlier someone talked about the flag burning case. I wonder what would happen if someone targeted someone who
served in World War II or Vietnam and was known to be very
patriotic. And they thought the way to get that S.O.B., who is
so patriotic, is to burn a flag in front of his door. If you target
that person that way and say, "I've got the Supreme Court on
my side, I can burn the American flag," I may have some
problems with that.
MR. SANDBERG: An interesting problem is that of a person
or victim with a low threshold for pain caused by bigotry. Let's
go away from the flag because I think it raises another question. I'd like to address my question, which builds on that, to
Professor Steenson. Your proposed civil remedy for verbal expression of bigotry, I take it, would certainly include completely non-criminal, non-prosecutable utterances of bigotry.
That's the verbal fist that in no way amounts to an assault. Is
that correct?
PROFESSOR STEENSON: Yes, I would include conduct. I

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss4/10
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to criminal

I think the eggshell-skull doctrine of tort

law, which lawyers and law students are familiar with, says that
we take our victim where we find him, infirmities and all. The
civil remedies adopted by the model codes and state statutes
basically provide a private right of action based on violation of
the stated criminal law. They're not as inclusive as your civil
remedy would be. How do we handle the victim who comes to
the table with a low threshold for tolerance of bigotry when it
is directed at him or at her?
PROFESSOR STEENSON: In lots of situations, it depends on
the nature of the charge-whether it's a racial epithet or
whether the verbal attack is based on sexual orientation of the
individual. The point is, in cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress the gist of the claim is finding out
what the weakness is and, in a sense, taking advantage of it.
What is a peculiar susceptibility in this context?
I'm not suggesting that everyone who has a peculiar susceptibility or is unusually aggravated by certain sorts of conduct
should have a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Those claims arise under circumstances where one
individual recognizes a weakness in another individual and exploits it. It seems to me it can almost be done on a group basis. If we talk to each other a little bit more, we'd probably
have a pretty good idea which buttons we could push on which
people. Everybody has a certain threshold, a certain weakness,
a certain susceptibility. And if you find it and exploit it, the
person who is exploited certainly is going to have a claim for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
It seems to me that it might operate on a broader basis. If
you pick on someone because of the person's sexual orientation and you know what it is and your intent is to inflict severe
emotional distress through the use of loaded words, or if you
pick on someone because of that person's race, it's quite clear
that the person has a certain threshold and susceptibility.
There are certain cultural biases, social biases, that exist. You
use those words to exploit that bias. It seems to me that those
sorts of claims are ready-made under circumstances where the
exploiting individual knows about the susceptibility.
Ms. SMABY: Professor Jones, I'll call on you in just a moPublished by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
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ment, but I want to do a quick follow up with Professor Steenson. Under one of your proposed remedies, doesn't that place
the burden on the individual, the victim, to seek redress as opposed to having Tom Foley charge up on a horse to pursue the
cause in a criminal action. And if that is correct, then how effective do you think your remedy would really be? How many
individuals would be willing to come forth?
PROFESSOR STEENSON:

I don't know. I don't know how ef-

fective it's going to be, but a civil remedy under the circumstances can't be less effective than the criminal remedy in the
R.A. V case. The individuals who were subjected to that action
undoubtedly would have a claim, not only for trespassing and
the consequent emotional distress, but probably for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. I'm not suggesting that
it would be a panacea. It's a remedy in addition to the criminal
remedy. The two are not by any means mutually exclusive.
Ms. SMABY: ProfessorJones, do you have something to say?
PROFESSOR JONES: The problem I have with an exclusive reliance upon intentional infliction of emotional distress, even as
a standard to inform what "fighting words" means, is that it
doesn't address the magnitude of the harm. It addresses only
one part of it, the injury to the individual. What's important
here is that the scope of the harm, if we look at it in the context
of the R.A. V. case as it's being duplicated around the country,
is that these kinds of instances arise very often when African
American families and couples are moving into formerly white
neighborhoods. The violence is directed at them, in part, to
resist their moving into those neighborhoods. It's not personally targeted because of a particular dislike of the individual.
It's directed at them because of their race, their sexual orientation, or some other kind of class identity which makes it a social injury and therefore much more appropriate for criminal
treatment than a tort remedy. Tort remedies obviously are
helpful and useful, but I think the standard has to be a criminally enforced standard.
MR. CLEARY: I actually have a question for the panel because
of what I've been hearing here. Professor Jones and Professor
Steenson, are you in favor of a return to the whole idea of
group libel?
PROFESSOR JONES: That's a great question, and I'd like to
respond to it. It's clear that the present Supreme Court, and
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss4/10
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probably any Supreme Court that we could constitute in these
times, would not decide Beauharnais' the way it was decided.
This is true largely because it made an assumption that certain
kinds of expression are outside the scope of protection of the
First Amendment. Now, I don't think that any of us, at least
not I, would argue for the application of Beauharnais in that
way. I think that the Supreme Court could profit from some of
the things that Justice Frankfurter did in that case. For example, he took account of the fact that, in Illinois, there had been
a large number of racial conflicts. Justice Frankfurter said the
legislature could take that into account and pass that kind of
criminal statute to redress that kind of injury.
What I'm suggesting is that there is a parallel in our society
now that the Supreme Court can take judicial notice of the fact
that what we're dealing with is not so much a problem of free
speech but a problem of racial and ethnic conflict. It is something within the purview of the legislature to criminalize that
kind of speech. And I think that the underlying premise of
Beauharnais-thatwe have to take our value to a large extent
from the groups with which we identify and by which we are
identified-is very much applicable now.
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: Justice Frankfurter decided-incorrectly, in my view-that it is constitutional for the local government to punish group libel, because he deferred a great deal to
local government units. He then went on, however, in dictum,
to pointedly say that he really questioned the wisdom and the
efficacy of this approach. It doesn't seem to me that it's something that is likely to be effective and, in fact, the history of
Illinois' enforcement of that statute is completely consistent
with the enforcement pattern of all similar statutes around the
world throughout history. It was used disproportionately to
target minority groups, including religious minority groups,
and that is what ultimately persuaded the Illinois legislature to
repeal the statute, even though the Supreme Court said they
had the authority to keep it on the books.
PROFESSOR JONES: I think that was a very sad event in our
history. I hope that the present Supreme Court does not articulate an opinion which causes state and local legislatures to
duck these problems in the same way. It seems to me, if we
3. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
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take some of the message of Chaplinsky4 into account, the alternative to taking the immediate infliction of harm into account
as a basis for a criminal statute is that we must resort to selfhelp.
Now I went to interview the Jones family yesterday. And I
talked to them at length as to what they experienced in the
cross-burning affair. And I think they probably would not be
upset by my telling you that their experience was what I would
have experienced that day. Mr. Jones has a very beautiful family-a beautiful wife and five children. His natural inclination
was to take a bat and go out and deal with the people who had
threatened the security of his home. He restrained himself, in
large part because he says that is irrational, and if he had done
that, he would have engaged in the same kind of irrational behavior that he was subjected to.
It seems to me that if we do not have adequate legal enforcement of criminal statutes to protect the victims, then we'll have
to take the law into our own hands and seek justice by acts of
private vengeance. Then we'll have not more speech but an
escalation of terror.
MR. CLEARY: The Jones family has consistently indicated
that they were threatened and terrorized. I'm sure that's what
they told you. There is a terroristic threats law available which
could have addressed these facts in a tougher manner than this
approach without implicating the First Amendment. I think we
can address the victims' concerns through the criminal code in
this fashion and still send a message to the community that
such conduct will not be tolerated without leaving open what
you leave open.
When you talk about group libel and Beauharnais,you discuss
these ideas in terms of psychic injury or harm. I find that very
frightening as a concept-that expression would be rated on
the basis of whether or not it could harm or injure a group.
That alone-if you think about race, religion, and gendercould silence political debate.
PROFESSOR JONES:

I don't see cross-burning as an invitation

to debate. I don't see wearing swastikas as an invitation to
political debate. I'm suggesting to you that the harm here is
not an attempt to communicate an expression of discomfort or
4. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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dislike. If that were what we were talking about, I would completely agree with you that you cannot criminalize that.
I don't think that you can criminalize expressions of facts,
values, opinions, and beliefs. But that's not what we're involved with. This ordinance, it seems to me, can properly be
limited so that it's talking about communications which are
harmful in the sense that they cause a definable injury. They
are situation-altering, you might say. They change relationships between the communicator and communicatee in a way
that I think society should not permit. They are not intended
to invite the expression of beliefs in response. They intend to
provoke some kind of behavior from the victim, like leaving the
community they just arrived in or coming out and fighting to
protect their honor and dignity. And I think that's very
distinguishable.
Ms. SMABY: Unfortunately, I need to bring this to a close,
though we still have some excellent questions up here. I hope,
if you all participate in the reception that will follow, you will
find one of these panel members and ask your question. We
do wish to end, however, by giving each of the panel members
anywhere from thirty to sixty seconds to give some sort of final
comment or concluding remark or final pitch. We will return
to the original order.
Mr. Foley, would you like to begin?
MR. FOLEY: The First Amendment was never intended to
protect an individual who burns a cross in the middle of the
night in the fenced yard of the only African American family in
the neighborhood. The City of St. Paul had the right to prohibit and prosecute such conduct. The ordinance at issue in
this case has been interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme
Court to prohibit only conduct that inflicts injury, tends to incite immediate breach of the peace, or provokes imminent lawless action. I think the construction by the Minnesota Supreme
Court should be upheld and the law is valid. Thank you.
MR. CLEARY: I hope the United States Supreme Court finds
in favor of the petitioner. There, I used just ten seconds.
Ms. SMABY: Do you wish to predict?
MR. CLEARY: No, I don't.
PROFESSOR JONES: We're not always able to do what's wise.
We very often are required to do what we feel is necessary. It
seems to me that in our present times it may be very necessary,
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
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even though not as wise as we'd like, to prohibit certain kinds
of behavior that really do inflict harm to try to stem the tide of
rising hate in our society.
MR. SANDBERG:

Hate crimes are akin to a cancer growing in

the kind of America in which we want to live. Those few who
will actually target law-abiding citizens for the commission of
criminal acts by virtue of who they are, what race they belong
to, their religion, their ethnicity, their sexual orientationthose are especially dangerous, corrosive criminals in our society. We've got to treat them that way. We've got to make clear
that those who indulge themselves, whatever their biases or
personal bigotries might be-we all have them-that those
who translate them into criminal attacks have to pay a heavier,
more serious price.
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: I think I can do no better than to read
to you the closing of the ACLU brief in this case:
It is tempting to say that the message conveyed by even
the public burning of a cross during a political rally is so
offensive, so hurtful, and so antithetical to the ideal of
equality, that it ought to be subject to prohibition without
the need for rigorous scrutiny of whether it crosses some
First Amendment line from protected advocacy to unprotected threats or intimidation. The Constitution, however,
does not tolerate such shortcuts.
At the same time, it would be wrong to ignore the undeniable fact that our history is replete with unfortunate incidents in which unpopular groups . . . were coerced into

forfeiting their constitutional rights because of threats or intimidation that often went unremedied and, during more
disgraceful periods, were tacitly condoned.
The task facing our nation is to promote the values of
both free speech and equality without sacrificing either....
[T]hat goal has not been met by the St. Paul ordinance at
issue in this case. 5
PROFESSOR WINER: With respect to hate crime statutes as
distinct from hate speech statutes, I think it might be a little
unfair to criticize them for being ineffective to the extent
you're expecting them to eradicate bigotry. Nobody's saying
that if you pass a hate crime statute, then all bias and bigotry
will go away. And if you say that there will still be bias and
5. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union at 22-23, R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No. 90-7675).
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bigotry after you pass one, I don't think that's an adequate argument against one.
You might say that hate crime statutes, as some people do,
make bigotry worse by encouraging resentment. It's not clear
to me that the same argument couldn't be made with respect to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and that doesn't mean that was a
bad idea.
MR. ABRAMS: I hope the City of St. Paul prevails in the
Supreme Court, and then I hope that the Court writes an opinion that would allow us to understand and appreciate that the
First Amendment is not the only amendment to the Constitution, that there are other amendments, and there are other
rights involved. A nation does not survive by speech alone;
there are other things.
PROFESSOR STEENSON:
I hope that the United States
Supreme Court can reach the accommodation that Professor
Strossen just mentioned by resort to the first prong of the
Chaplinsky standard, the injury standard. With respect to the
accommodation between free speech and equality, in my own
mind I keep coming back to what Justice Blackmun said in
Bakke.6 I'm using race to include other target groups. In order
for race to be relevant in the future, it has to be a factor now.
Ms. SMABY: And finally, Professor Farber. Can you make
sense of all of this?
PROFESSOR FARBER: In thirty seconds, no. I mostly want to
respond to, and not necessarily to disagree with, something
Mr. Sandberg said about hate crime as a cancer in our society.
I don't think that's quite right. I think it's the underlying current of hatred and bias that's the cancer. Hate crime is a symptom, maybe a symptom that we need to treat, but I wish we
knew what to do about the underlying disease.
Ms. SMABY: Ladies and gentlemen, that must conclude this
symposium. Please thank the members of our panel for us.
Thank you all very much.
6. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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